Lessons Learned from the British Columbia AI Outbreak

Designate one person as the coordinator of the disease response

Lesson One:
Designate one person as the coordinator of the disease response
This person should be assisted by an advisory committee. This committee must include representation from the industry (including production, feed mills, catchers, C&D), veterinarians, provincial lab, municipal staff, provincial ministry of agriculture, and non-commercial flock/herd owners.

Lesson Two:
You don’t find it if you don’t look for it
Most Canadian provinces have downsized their provincial animal health laboratories to the point where they are incapable of doing active surveillance.
Without such an “Early Warning System” we are unprepared to proactively seek and destroy disease threats before they spread and cause havoc. Viruses are unique and adaptable and may not follow expected patterns.

Lesson Three:
Act quickly and decisively if a communicable disease is suspected
The B.C. outbreak and several U.S. outbreaks have shown clearly that suspicion of disease should trigger a quarantine and depopulation before laboratory confirmation. Producers should self-quarantine in consultation with their veterinarians. The local diagnostic lab should be used and the results listened to.

Lesson Four:
Delays in testing and response cause trouble
The local laboratories should be pre-accredited and strict biosecurity procedures should be in place in all provincial labs. Utilize test results from provincial labs to determine actions needed and then confirm with the final results from the NCFAD.

Lesson Five:
Industry involvement in decision-making is crucial from day one Local expertise needs to be clearly identified pre-outbreak and then effectively used from day one of the outbreak.
Local veterinarians and industry representatives need to be involved in decision-making at the Emergency Operations Centre at the outset. This expertise is invaluable in both skill level and local knowledge.

Lesson Six:
Emergency Response Plans are needed by every municipality and every commodity group
Everyone’s roles and responsibilities have to be outlined and pre-planned and tested regularly. Extensive and updated contact lists are needed, and communication plans must be in place.

Lesson Seven:
Emergency protocols for the disposal of euthanized animals or birds and for contaminated manure must be detailed and in place
Every Avian Influenza outbreak in the U.S. has clearly indicated that dead birds should NOT be moved outside the barn until composted and until heat and time have killed the virus.
In the case of large animals, they should not be moved off the property but buried or composted on-site. In some areas, livestock producers are required to file an approved plan for handling mass mortalities on-farm.

Lesson Eight:
Clear, ongoing communications with all stakeholders is vital
Communicating the details of the ongoing outbreak situation must be done on a daily basis to keep all stakeholders up to date. Producers should be communicated with via teleconference, conference calls, fax and e-mail so they do not have to meet physically and risk cross-contamination.
The media should also be included in this information plan and prohibited from entering high risk and control zones because of the danger of spreading disease.
Backyard flock owners (or hobby farmers) also must be kept informed.

Lesson Nine:
In the event of a disease outbreak, privacy legislation seriously hinders disease control
The industry simply has to be aware of where the initial outbreak is located and where subsequent outbreaks have occurred in order to initiate their preplanned All-Industry biosecurity and control protocols. If the CFIA or government is unable or unwilling to override privacy legislation in the event of an outbreak, then industry must be prepared to provide specific details to all segments of the industry.

Lesson Ten:
Every precaution must be taken to ensure that the disease is not being spread
Producers voiced concern about having regular in-barn visits from CFIA staff to take blood samples from birds, when there was no assurance that these staff were not spreading disease. It was recommended that producers should be trained to take blood samples themselves.
Many concerns were also raised about the ineffectiveness of the road blocks around the high-risk zones. It was highly recommended that traffic in these areas be restricted to essential traffic only, and that all vehicles entering and exiting the zones be decontaminated.

Lesson Eleven:
The cleanup and disinfection after the outbreak must have a clearly defined set of  requirements and specifically assigned and trained inspectors
Producers must clearly understand what standards they must reach in order to be permitted to restock. CFIA inspectors must apply consistent standards on each farm when inspecting the premises. Municipalities must be prepared to permit the burning of outbuildings if the producer wishes to do so.